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Abstract
This note argues that the most commonly used estimates of the size of the unofficial economies
in the former Soviet republics are flawed.  Most important, they are based on calculations that
disregard the variation in unofficial economic activity across space in the pre-transition Soviet
Union. In addition, these estimates appear to understate the size of the unofficial economies in
these countries. We propose alternative estimates and find that they are more strongly related to
the institutional factors commonly used to explain the size of the unofficial sector.  Our
estimates also show that the size of a country's pre-transition unofficial economy is an important
predictor of its size during the transition.  This suggests that the size of the unofficial economy is
to a large extent a historical phenomenon only partly determined by contemporary institutional
factors.
JEL classification: O17, P2, P3
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Non-Technical Summary
Conventional wisdom holds that the unofficial economies in post-socialist countries
are quite large.  With state institutions still developing the capacity to regulate and measure
market-based activities, it is widely believed that a significant share of the goods and
services produced in these economies does not enter into official estimates of GDP.  But
how much?  Arriving at a precise answer to this question is impossible, and even a
reasonable approximation is not easy to come by.  Nor is the answer trivial in its
consequences.  A better sense of the size (and nature) of the unofficial economy may lead
to a re-assessment of output dynamics during the transition and influence policies from
public finance to social protection.
In this note, we argue that the most frequently cited size estimates of the unofficial
economies in the FSU are flawed by an assumption that the unofficial economies of the
former Soviet republics accounted for the same 12% share of their total GDP in 1989.
Starting from that assumption Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) and Johnson, Kaufmann
and Shleifer (1997) assumed a near unit-elasticity relationship between measured electricity
consumption and total economic activity -- measured and unmeasured.  This approach led
them to conclude that by the middle of the 1990s, unofficial economies in the FSU ranged
from a low of 6.5% in Uzbekistan to a high of 62.6% in Georgia.
We use both labor input and household income data collected in the Berkeley-Duke
survey project to show that the average size of the unofficial economies in the Soviet
republics, most likely, exceeded 12% of total GDP and, certainly, varied a great deal in size
across space. We re-estimate the sizes of republic-level unofficial economies at the end of
the socialist period and confirm the significant variation in the extent of unmeasured
economic activity. Specifically, the Berkeley-Duke data suggest relatively high amounts of
unofficial activity in the Caucasian and Central Asian republics and relatively low levels in
the European republics. Using these new estimates, we apply the same “electricity
consumption” methodology used in the aforementioned studies to trace the dynamics of
the unofficial economy during the transition.  This leads us to a revised set of estimates for
the size of unofficial economies in 1995.  Our estimates range from a low of 21.9% in
Estonia to a high of 71.4% in Georgia.
In a series of regressions, we demonstrate that our set of revisions is more closely
related to governance indices that had previously been shown to be associated with
unofficial economic activity.  Because of the potential simultaneity between governance and
the unofficial economy, we also present the results using two variables to instrument for the
governance regressors. The comparative results remain similar to those in the OLS
regressions.
We also show that the previous estimates may have biased the conclusions of the
researchers who used them.  Surprisingly, Johnson et al. (1997) found that the size of a
country's unofficial economy in 1989 did not have a statistically significant impact on the
size of its unofficial economy in 1995.  In regressions with our estimates, however, the pre-
transition status of the unofficial economy plays a prominent role, partly at the expense of
the governance indicators. This outcome suggests that the size of the unofficial economy is
to a large extent a historical phenomenon only partly determined by contemporary
governance indicators, which themselves may be historically determined and not easily
modified by policy initiatives.William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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A Note on Measuring the Unofficial Economy in the Former Soviet Republics 
 
1. Introduction 
  Conventional wisdom holds that the unofficial economies in post-socialist countries are 
quite large.  With state institutions still developing the capacity to regulate and measure market-based 
activities, it is widely believed that a significant share of the goods and services produced in these 
economies does not enter into official estimates of GDP.  But how much?  Arriving at a precise 
answer to this question is impossible, and even a reasonable approximation is not easy to come by.  
Nor is the answer trivial in its consequences.  A better sense of the size (and nature) of the unofficial 
economy may lead to a re-assessment of output dynamics during the transition and influence 
policies from public finance to social protection.  
Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) were the first to apply a consistent methodology to 
measuring the unofficial economies in formerly socialist countries.  Drawing on the same approach, 
Johnson et al. (1997) updated Kaufmann and Kaliberda's work, producing estimates for the size of 
the unofficial economy in eleven former Soviet republics and six Central and East European 
countries in 1995.   Subsequent studies by Johnson et al. (1998), Friedman et al. (2000), Schneider 
and Enste (2000), Rosser et al. (2000) and Johnson and Kaufmann (2001) used these estimates to 
evaluate the causes and consequences of cross-country variation in unofficial economic activity.  
Although this work has done much to advance understanding of unofficial economies during the 
transition, we feel that the size estimates of Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) and Johnson et al. 
(1997) were significantly flawed by an assumption that the unofficial economies of the pre-transition 
former Soviet republics accounted for the same 12% share of their total GDP.   
Below we address this important element of the discussion of the post-socialist unofficial 
economy.  Using data from the Berkeley-Duke survey project, we show both that the average size of 
the unofficial economies in the Soviet republics was significantly larger than assumed by Kaufmann 
and Kaliberda (1996) and that there was a good deal of variation in their size across space.1  On the 
basis of the Berkeley-Duke data, we re-estimate the size of the unofficial economies at the end of the 
socialist period.  Using these new estimates, we apply the same methodology used by both 
Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) and Johnson et al. (1997) to trace the dynamics of the unofficial William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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economy during the transition.  This leads us to a revised set of estimates for the size of unofficial 
economies in 1995.  We conclude with a series of side-by-side comparisons.  These demonstrate that 
our revisions are more closely related than the previous estimates to a set of governance variables 
that have been shown to be associated with unofficial economic activity. Perhaps even more 
important, we show that the flawed estimates may have biased the conclusions of the researchers 
who used them.  Johnson et al. (1997) found, surprisingly, that pre-transition conditions had no 
impact on the size of unofficial economies in 1995.  Specifically, they point out that the size of a 
country's unofficial economy in 1989 did not have a statistically significant impact on the size of its 
unofficial economy in 1995.  In regressions with our estimates, however, the pre-transition 
conditions play a prominent role, partly at the expense of the governance indicators. This outcome 
suggests that the size of the unofficial economy is to a large extent a historical phenomenon only 
partly determined by contemporary governance indicators, which themselves may be historically 
determined and not easily modified by policy initiatives. 
 
2. The Electricity Consumption Methodology   
The initial study by Kaufmann and Kaliberda started from the observation that in the short 
run electricity consumption and total economic activity move in parallel fashion, with near unit-
elasticity.2  Thus the difference between the growth rates of measured GDP and electricity 
consumption can yield an estimate of the change in the size of the unofficial economy, which 
Kaufmann and Kaliberda define as “the unrecorded value added by any deliberate misreporting or 
evasion by a firm or individual (p. 83).”  
Kaufmann and Kaliberda sub-divided the post-socialist countries into three groups on the 
basis of differences in the timing and scope of policy reform.3  Since energy prices were liberated 
earlier and more extensively in Central and Eastern Europe, that region’s countries were assumed to 
be more efficient consumers of energy than others in the post-socialist world.  Electricity 
consumption, that is, was presumed to rise more slowly and fall more quickly relative to rises and 
falls, respectively, in total output.  Energy prices were liberalized later in the Baltic economies and 
still later and not as comprehensively in the rest of the former Soviet Union.  Following this tri-
partite division, Kaufmann and Kaliberda applied the output elasticity of electricity-consumption 
measures that are re-produced in Table 1. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
 
 
3
By themselves, these elasticities are useful only for estimating the change in the size of the 
unofficial economy for given dynamics in measured output and electricity consumption.  In order to 
use them for computing the contribution of a country’s unofficial economy to its total GDP, one 
needs to work from an estimated baseline.  For instance, if the initial share of the unofficial 
economy in a country’s total GDP is estimated to be 10%, and if official (i.e., measured) GDP and 
electricity consumption grow by 3% and 5%, respectively, the unofficial economy would be 
presumed to have grown to 11.7% of all economic activity.4  Thus, to estimate the size of the 
unofficial economy in the former Soviet republics during the transition, Kaufmann and Kaliberda 
worked from estimates of their sizes in the pre-transition period.   
Since there were no widely recognized estimates of the sizes of the unofficial economies in 
the Soviet republics, Kaufmann and Kaliberda assumed that the size of the unofficial economy was 
uniform across the USSR.   Without being specific, they wrote: 
On the basis of the Berkeley-Duke research project on the USSR Second 
Economy … as well as the work of J. Braithwaite, estimates ranging roughly 
between 10 and 15 percent of total economic activity were arrived at.  Thus … we 
use the 1989 midpoint estimate share of unofficial activities of 12 percent (pp. 93-
94).  
They relied upon other country-level studies to establish the size of unofficial economies in 1989 in 
Central and Eastern Europe.5  All the estimates appear in the first column of Table 2.   
By comparing the dynamics of measured output and electricity consumption and applying 
the noted estimates of elasticities, Kaufmann and Kaliberda arrived at size estimates for 1994.  Using 
a year's worth of additional data, Johnson et al. (1997) followed the same approach and produced 
estimates for 1995.6  As shown in Table 2, they found that the unofficial economy represented a 
significant share of total output both prior to and during the transition.  But whereas in Central and 
Eastern Europe there was generally little change in its size relative to measured output, there was a 
significant increase in its relative magnitude in the former Soviet republics.  This trend appears to 
have been most pronounced in the Caucasian states of Azerbaijan and Georgia where unofficial 
activity is reported to have jumped from twelve percent to well over half of total GDP. 
The estimates of Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) and Johnson et al. (1997) have been 
recognized as the most comprehensive, internally consistent set of estimates of the unofficial 
economy in post-socialist countries.  But their approach has been criticized.  In general terms, it has William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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been noted that unofficial economy activities can vary greatly with respect to the amount of 
electricity that they require; likewise, the differences in elasticities across space and time can be 
considerable and quite difficult to calibrate (Shneider and Entse, 2000).  Lacko (2000), although an 
advocate of using electricity consumption, voices skepticism at some of the estimates produced by 
Kaufmann and Kaliberda's methodology.  In particular, she suggests that their findings of significant 
cross-country variation in unofficial economy dynamics do not pass the believabilty test.   She 
proposes an alternative methodology that involves econometrically estimating per capita household 
electricity consumption. Her methodology is considerably more complicated than Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda’s and it has its own serious shortcomings, some of which are noted by Schneider and 
Enste (2000).  Moreover, her estimates also fail the belivability test. For example, according to 
Lacko, the shares of the hidden economy in Latvia and Lithuania far exceed those in Russia, 
Uzbekistan, and Kazakhstan. This is hard to reconcile with anecdotal evidence and common 
perception. Given these considerations and the fact that Kaufmann and Kaliberda’s estimates have 
been more commonly cited, we concentrate on their approach. We will, however, compare our 
estimates with those by Lacko as well.  
We agree with Kaufman and Kaliberda that changes in electricity consumption can serve as a 
consistent, albeit very rough, metric for assessing unofficial economy dynamics across countries.  We 
note, however, the crucial role of the initial estimates in evaluating the size of the unofficial economy 
in any given year via electricity consumption. Surprisingly, Kaufmann and Kaliberda did not devote 
much space to justifying their assumption that the size of the unofficial economy in 1989 was 
uniform across all Soviet republics.  Nor do they offer much support for their estimate that the 
unofficial economy accounted for only 12% of total Soviet GDP.  In the next section, we will use 
the publications of the same Berkeley-Duke project that was referenced by Kaufmann and Kaliberda 
to arrive at dramatically different estimates of the Soviet unofficial economy circa 1989.  
3. The Berkeley-Duke Project and the Estimates of the Unofficial Economy Size 
  Soviet and Western researchers proffered a number of estimates of the size of the unofficial 
economy in the Soviet Union.7 Usually, these estimates were not presented as a share of GDP 
because it is often unclear to what extent unofficial economic activities add to the official GDP.  For 
example, if a home owner rents out part of his home in a transaction that is not declared to the tax 
authorities, this is presumably part of the unofficial economy. But the official GDP includes not 
only the value of paid rent, but also the imputed rent on owner-occupied housing. Therefore, the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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unofficial rental income would be included in the GDP although it might be misclassified as 
imputed rent instead of paid rent. Also, GDP calculations are often based on sources such as 
consumer surveys that may take into account many unofficial transactions.8 We will disregard these 
methodological issues and follow Kaufmann and Kaliberda in assuming that the share of the 
unofficial economy in GDP is roughly equal to some measure of the share of unofficial economic 
activity in all economic activity. For example, one such measure may be the share of labor inputs 
used in the unofficial economy. 
  As we mentioned in the previous section, Kaufmann and Kaliberda did not fully develop the 
justification for their 1989 estimates.  They simply made a rather general reference to various issues 
of  Berkeley-Duke Occasional Papers on the Second Economy in the USSR (BDOP) and a report by 
Braithwaite (1995).9  We have been able to find only two more or less general estimates of the size 
of the Soviet unofficial economy based on the Berkeley-Duke survey data in the BDOP. First, 
Grossman (1991) presents measures of the share of urban household income derived from the 
second economy.  Second, Treml (1992) estimates the amount of labor inputs used in the Soviet 
second economy in urban areas. Next, we will briefly examine these estimates and argue that 
Kaufmann and Kaliberda’s 12% estimate most likely understates the size of the unofficial economy 
in the Soviet Union as a whole and most certainly fails to capture the variation in its size across the 
individual republics. 
  A note on terminology is in order. Both Grossman and Treml defined the second economy 
in the Soviet Union as all economic activity that either is directly for private gain or knowingly 
contravenes the law, or both.  Kaufman and Kaliberda define the unofficial economy as constituting 
activity that is not recorded in the official GDP. Clearly, Grossman’s definition is broader because it 
includes private legal economic activities that were included in the country’s official statistics. But for 
urban USSR circa 1979, the year to which both Grossman’s and Treml’s second economy estimates 
refer, this distinction is likely to be unimportant since the official private sector was negligible.  
  According to Treml’s estimates, 11.8% of all working time in the Soviet urban economy in 
1979 was spent on private economic activities. Assuming that the productivity in the unofficial 
economy was the same as in the official economy, this number suggests that 12% of GDP would be 
a reasonable estimate for the size of the unofficial economy in 1979. Is the assumption of equal 
labor productivity in the two economies reasonable? There are arguments both for and against. For 
example, the unofficial economy’s productivity may be higher, because it offered much more William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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powerful incentives. On the other hand, the capital-labor ratio in the unofficial economy was 
probably lower than in the official one, suggesting that the productivity in the former was also lower, 
other things being equal.10 Ideally, we would like to have estimates for the value of output rather 
than inputs in both economies. 
  Based on the same Berkeley-Duke survey data, Grossman (1991) estimates that Soviet urban 
households derived on average over 30% of their total income from unofficial or second economy 
sources. In evaluating these estimates, one should keep in mind that household income from 
unofficial sources probably included at least part of the capital income from the second economy, 
while official capital income, to the extent it was not distributed in transfers and wage subsidies, 
accrued to the state. Nonetheless, the 30% figure suggests that productivity was probably higher in 
the unofficial economy than in its official counterpart. 
  Whether or not one accepts either the 12% or the 30% figure as a suitable estimate of the 
share of the unofficial economy in total GDP, it is almost certain that this share increased between 
1979, the modal reference year for the Berkeley-Duke survey, and 1989. The reasons for this growth, 
particularly in the second half of the 1980’s, included increased imbalances between household 
incomes and opportunities to spend it in the official economy, new opportunities for unofficial 
economic activities engendered by greater autonomy of state enterprises, and Gorbachev’s anti-
alcohol campaign that resulted in an explosion of bootlegging and exacerbated inflationary 
pressures.11 Later, we will extrapolate the estimates based on Berkeley-Duke data from 1979 to 1989 
and show that Kaufmann and Kaliberda significantly underestimated the size of the Soviet unofficial 
economy prior to the transition.  More important, the Berkeley-Duke study makes clear that 
Kaufmann and Kaliberda erred by not making any allowance for the substantial differences in the 
volume of unofficial economic activity across the former Soviet republics.  Grossman (1991), in 
breaking down urban household income data from official and unofficial sources for several groups 
of former Soviet republics, presents the most comprehensive data that can be used to make 
quantitative estimates in this regard. Table 3 summarizes the relevant numbers. 
Grossman does not present incomes for some of the republics. Therefore, for those republics we 
had to make estimates using aggregated regional data. For example, to calculate incomes for the 
Baltic republics, we took out the data on Russia from the Russia-Baltic subzone, using the following 
formula: 
 I B = (IRB⋅ NRB – IR⋅ NR)/(NRB – NR) William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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where I stands for per capita income, N denotes the number of observations, and subscripts B, RB, 
and R refer to the Baltic republics, the Russia-Baltic subzone, and Russia, respectively. We then 
assumed that the size of the unofficial economy was the same across republics within each region 
for which we could not obtain separate estimates. For example, Belorussia and Moldavia were 
presumed to have the same shares.   And we assumed the same for the republics in the South zone 
as well as for those in the Baltic region. The results of these calculations are shown in Table 4 below. 
Notice that the shares of unofficial incomes vary in the range from 0.27 in Russia to 0.50 in the 
South zone.  
As we suggested earlier, the fractions in the last column of Table 4 probably overestate the 
share of the unofficial economy in Soviet GDP because they do not account for capital income 
accrued to the Soviet state.  Thus, on the basis of Treml's (1992) esimtates of labor inputs, we adopt  
the 12% figure as a conservative estimate of the share of unofficial economic activity in total GDP.  
However, unlike Kaufmann and Kaliberda, we take this share to refer to 1979 since that was the year 
for which Treml made his estimate. 
  In order to determine the share of the unofficial economy in the Soviet Union in 1989, we 
use the same technique that Kaufmann and Kaliberda used to project their estimates from 1989 to 
1995. According to the CIA estimates, between 1980 and 1989, Soviet official GDP grew by 
approximately 21%. Over the same period, electric power output increased by about 36%.12 
Assuming that in 1979 the unofficial economy contributed 12% of total GDP and using unitary 
elasticity of total GDP with respect to electricity output, we can infer that by 1989 the unofficial 
economy share grew to about 22%.13 This is the base estimate that we will use in our further 
calculations. 
  Next, we determine the unofficial economy shares in eleven Soviet republics. (Following 
Kaufmann and Kaliberda, we exclude four republics from our calculations because we do not have 
adequate electricity consumption data to estimate unofficial economy shares in 1995.) While 
Grossman’s estimates of second economy household incomes in different republics may not 
measure the share of the unofficial economy in the GDP, we assume that his estimates adequately 
reflect the size of unofficial economies in these republics in relative terms. We assume, for example, 
that because South zone households obtained 50% of their incomes from the second economy 
versus only 27% in Russia, the share of the unofficial economy in GDP was almost twice as high in 
the republics of the South zone as it was in Russia. Given the relative shares shown in Table 4 and William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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using republican GNP data we can calculate the size of the unofficial economy in each republic, 
making sure that the share of the unofficial economy for these republics as a group equals 22%. 
Table 5 presents the results. In order to obtain the 22% share, we had to scale the shares implied by 
Grossman by approximately two-thirds. For example, for Azerbaijan, 0.5⋅ 0.66=0.33.  
Finally, we project our 1989 unofficial economy estimates to 1995, again using Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda’s technique. Using our estimates for the unofficial economy in 1989 and the GDP and 
electricity output indices from Johnson et al. (1997), we calculate the 1995 shares according to the 
following formula:14 
 UE95 = 1 −  (1-UE89)⋅ XOF/XEL 
where UE denotes the share of the unofficial economy in total GDP and XOF and XEL denote, 
respectively, the indices of official GDP and total output as proxied for by electricity consumption. 
The results of these calculations are presented in the next to last column of Table 6. For 
comparison, we also show the estimates that Johnson et al. (1997) obtained using Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda's methodology.  In the next section, we will compare both their and our estimates for 
1995 in a series of side-by-side regressions. 
4. Side-by-Side Comparisons 
One might expect that the more intrusive and the less helpful government is vis-a-vis 
business, the more likely firms are to exit into the unofficial economy.   More burdensome taxation 
and regulation, more corruption and poorer provision of public goods all are likely to encourage 
evasion from government's reach. But evaluating this proposition econometrically presents 
problems. First, variables that measure state policies and capabilities tend to be highly correlated and 
so multicollinearity becomes a problem when more than one are used as regressors.  Second, 
governance may be endogenous to the size of the unofficial economy.  For example, when firms 
enter the unofficial economy, they pay less tax and thereby diminish government's ability to provide 
public goods.  This simultaneity bias can only be alleviated if appropriate instrumental variables can 
be found. 
In addition to governance, it would also be reasonable to expect that a country's traditions 
and norms would play an important role in determining the extent of unofficial economic activity. 
Such virtually unmeasurable factors may at least be partly reflected in the historical size of the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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unofficial economy in a country. For this reason, in what follows, we highlight regressions in which 
the pre-transition share of the unofficial economy serves as one of the controls. 
Several recent studies have uncovered a strong empirical relationship between the size of 
unofficial economies and governance.  Johnson et al. (1997) found unofficial economy size in 
transitioning countries to be inversely related to fairer taxation, fewer regulations and more effective 
provision of public goods.  Johnson et al. (1998) and Friedman et al. (2000) further confirmed strong 
associations between unofficial activity and measures of governance using expanded databases that 
included OECD and developing countries.  
Applying the same approach, we compare the performance of our estimates of second 
economy size with those of Johnson et al. (1997). While our point estimates of the relevant 
coefficients are broadly similar to theirs, we find two important differences that support our 
estimates. First, our regressions exhibit better fit as measured by both the R2 values and the 
statistical significance of the coefficients, which, of course, are equivalent for the bivariate 
regressions. Second, the coefficient on the pre-transition size of unofficial economy is highly 
significant in several of our regressions, while it is statistically insignificant in all of the 
corresponding Johnson et al. (1997) regressions. We discuss both differences in some detail in turn.  
The value of R2 can serve as a test of the accuracy of the dependent variable only under 
rather limited circumstances. For example, let the true relationship between a dependent variable Y 
and independent variable X be Y=α +β X+ε , where α  and β  are constant coefficients and ε  is a 
random error that satisfies the OLS assumptions. Suppose now that we have two measures of Y that 
have errors denoted, respectively, by J and K. In other words, under the first measure we observe 
values Y+J, while under the second we observe Y+K.  Suppose also that when we regress Y+J and 
Y+K on X, we obtain the respective R2 values of of rJ and rK. It is straightforward to show that if 
the values of J and K are uncorrelated with either Y or ε , then rK>rJ implies that the variance of K is 
lower than the variance of J. This would indeed suggest that Y+K is a better estimate of Y than Y+J 
if both K and J have the same mean. However, if K and J have different means, the value of R2 says 
nothing about which error has a smaller mean. This is because the difference in the means of the 
measurement errors of the dependent variables would be reflected only in the point estimates of the 
constant term. Therefore, if the above assumptions on the measurement errors are satisfied, the 
better fit of our regressions favors our estimates of the unofficial economies across the former William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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Soviet republics. As for the higher average size of unofficial economy according to our estimates, we 
can rely only on the arguments presented in the previous section. 
With the above discussion in mind, consider Table 7.  It reports the outcomes from three 
pairs of bivariate regressions, each of which uses the same governance variables as regressors as 
Johnson et al. (1997).15  The third column in Table 7 reproduces results presented in Johnson et al. 
(1997) for fifteen transitioning countries -- the six East European countries and nine of the former 
Soviet republics listed in the bottom half of Table 2.  The results recorded in column four are 
similarly derived with the exception that they are based on our estimates for the relative size of the 
unofficial economy.16  
Although they produce estimates for the unofficial economies of Belarus and Uzbekistan, 
Johnson et al. (1997) do not include these two in their regressions. They argue that the governments 
in these two countries were so repressive that "entrepreneurs [could not] switch into the unofficial 
sector." This strikes us as an odd line of reasoning.  Generally, all governments try to prevent entry 
into the unofficial sector.  And, no doubt, there is a good deal of variation in their capabilities.  But 
these are the very sort of differences in governance that our regressors are designed to capture.  We, 
therefore, run the same set of regressions with Belarus and Uzbekistan.17   Using the expanded set of 
seventeen countries, the results for Johnson et al.'s (1997) and our estimates are presented side-by-
side in the first two columns of Table 7.  Columns five and six show the results of the same 
regressions run on just the eleven former Soviet republics for which we developed new estimates.  
All the variables in these regressions have the expected negative signs.  Better governance, 
that is, is associated with smaller unofficial economies.  But the series using our re-estimates offer 
stronger support for this proposition. Comparing the R2 values across each pair of regressions using 
the same governance variable and the same sample of countries, the ones using our re-estimates are 
almost uniformly higher.  With the exception of “regulation” (for which we do not have a complete 
set of data for all seventeen countries), governance variables explain more of the variation in the size 
of the second economy as we have estimated it. Furthermore, plugging our re-estimates into the 
larger seventeen country data set, we find that all five of the variables are significant at the 1% level; 
only one, however, is significant at this level using the Johnson et al. (1997) estimates.  
Because of the potential simultaneity between governance and the unofficial economy, Table 
7 also presents the results using two variables to instrument for the governance regressor: the 
distance of the country's capital city from Brussels and a dummy variable that indicates whether the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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country used to be part of the Soviet Union. The comparative results are similar to those in the OLS 
regressions. 
A somewhat surprising feature of Johnson et al.’s (1997) regressions is the lack of any strong 
relationship between the pre- and post-transition shares of the unofficial economy.  As shown in 
Table 8, in their regressions, none of the coefficients on their 1989 share estimates are statistically 
significant in determining 1995 shares.  This is particularly unexpected because in the absence of any 
cross-country variation in the rate of structural change during the 1989–1995 period, the correlation 
between the two sets of shares would have been perfect. Did the transition produce such a radical 
change of regime with respect to the unofficial economy share of GDP that the post-transition 
governance indicators became the only significant explanatory factor? In contrast to Johnson et al. 
(1997), our estimates show that this was not the case. The pre-transition shares of the unofficial 
economy are positive and highly significant in all our OLS regressions for 15 economies and are 
significant at least at the 10% level in our 17-economy regressions (see Table 8). While this 
correlation is natural because we work with levels (shares) rather than growth rates, we would argue 
that the correlation is enhanced because the pre-transition shares of unofficial economy could be 
viewed as proxies for cultural environment and historical factors in each country.18 To the extent 
that this is the case, the positive relationship between the 1989 and 1995 shares suggests that the 
shares of the unofficial economy are path-dependent and only partly determined by the post-
transition governance environment. Finally, given that the positive relationship between the 1989 
and 1995 shares is to be expected, the fact that it exists for our estimates reinforces their validity 
relative to the estimates produced by Kaufmann and Kaliberda. 
We present additional results in the Appendix tables.  All offer further confirmation of the 
conclusions drawn from Table 7.  Table 1A re-produces regressions that control for being a former 
Soviet republic.  Table 2A presents the same set of bivariate regressions run in Table 7 but makes 
the comparison between our and Lacko's estimates.  Table 3A runs the same regression as in Table 7 
but for a newer set of governance variables recently released by the World Bank.  The R2 values for 
our estimates and the significance of the coefficients are consistently higher in the pairwise 
comparisons.   
5. Conclusion 
  In this paper, we argue that the most commonly used estimates of the shares of the 
unofficial economy in the former Soviet republics are flawed in two important respects.  First, the William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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estimates of Kaufmann and Kaliberda and Johnson et al. (1997) disregard the variation in the 
development of unofficial economies across space in the former Soviet Union. Second, their 
estimates for 1989 and, as a consequence, for 1995 significantly understate the average size of 
unofficial economies in this entire group of countries. We propose our own estimates and compare 
the two sets by evaluating how strongly they are related to the institutional factors commonly used 
to explain the size of the unofficial sector. We find that our estimates, combined with Kaufmann 
and Kaliberda’s estimates for a few other transition economies, are more strongly associated with the 
explanatory variables as measured by the R2 values and the statistical significance of the coefficients 
in almost all regressions.  
  In addition, we question the validity of Kaufmann and Kaliberda’s estimates in view of the 
fact that their 1995 unofficial economy shares are uncorrelated with their 1989 estimates. The 
absence of a positive correlation is surprising because the levels of unofficial activity are unlikely to 
change radically and differently across countries over six years, even during the economic transition. 
In contrast, our 1995 estimates are clearly positively correlated with our 1989 estimates. Moreover, 
the 1989 shares remain a significant explanatory factor in our regressions even in the presence of 
explanatory governance variables, suggesting perhaps that the pre-transition starting point is 
important above and beyond the institutional environment that was achieved in the process of 
transition. 
  Finally, we compare the goodness of fit of our estimates with those generated by Lacko 
(2000). Here again, our estimates perform better than hers in the regressions. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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Table 1. Output Elasticity of Electricity-consumption 
Elasticity  Central and East Europe Baltic Countries  Former Soviet Union 
Output Rises  0.9  1.0  1.15 
Output Falls  1.11  1.0  0.87 
 
Note: Output elasticity of electricity-consumption measures the percentage change in 
measured electricity consumption divided by the percentage change in total GDP. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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Table 2. Unofficial Economy’s Share of Total Output: 
Kaufmann and Kaliberda's Methodology 
 
Central and Eastern Europe  1989  1994  1995 
Bulgaria 22.8  29.1  36.2 
Czech Republic  6.0  17.6  11.3 
Hungary 27.0  27.7  29.0 
Poland 15.7  15.2  12.6 
Romania 22.3  17.4  19.1 
Slovakia 6.0  14.6  5.8 
Former Soviet Union      
Azerbaijan 12.0  58.0  60.6 
Belarus 12.0  18.9  19.3 
Estonia 12.0  25.1  11.8 
Georgia 12.0  63.5  62.6 
Kazakhstan 12.0  34.1  34.3 
Latvia 12.0  34.2  35.3 
Lithuania 12.0  28.7  21.6 
Moldova 12.0  39.7  35.7 
Russia 12.0  40.3  41.6 
Ukraine 12.0  45.7  48.9 
Uzbekistan 12.0  9.5  6.5 
 
Note: Neither Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996) nor Johnson et al. 
(1997) presented estimates for Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Tadzhikistan or 
Turkmenistan.  See p. 176 in Johnson et al. (1997). 
Source: Johnson et al. (1997). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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Table 3. Per Capita Incomes from Official and 
Unofficial Sources: Berkeley-Duke Survey 
 
Region Number  of 
observations
Socialist 
income 
Total personal 
income 
Unofficia
l income 
North zone  1944  1280  1890  610 
 Russia-Baltic  subzone  1384  1270  1780  510 
  Russia  1057  1330  1830  500 
 Belorussia-Moldavia-Ukraine  560  1300  2170  870 
  Ukraine  361  1350  2190  840 
South zone excluding Armenia  488  896  1780  884 
 
Notes: 1. North zone includes Russia, Ukraine, Belorussia, the Baltic republics, and Moldavia. 
South zone includes all other republics. We exclude Armenia because, like Kaufmann and 
Kaliberda we do not have the electricity consumption data that would be necessary for our 
subsequent estimates. 2. We refer to the former Soviet republics by their Soviet names. 
Source: Grossman (1991), pp. 13-16. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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Table 4.  Per Capita Incomes from Official and Unofficial Sources  
for 11 Soviet Republics: Berkeley-Duke Survey 
 
Region Number  of 
observations 
Socialist 
income 
Total 
personal 
income 
Unofficial 
income 
Share of 
unofficial 
income 
Russia 1057  1330  1830  500  0.27 
Baltic republics  327 1076.1  1618.4  542.3 0.34 
Belorussia-Moldavia  199 1209.3  2133.7  924.4 0.43 
Ukraine 361  1350  2190  840  0.38 
South zone 
excluding Armenia 
488 896  1780  884 0.50 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Grossman (1991), pp. 13-16. 
 William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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Table 5.  Estimated Shares of Unofficial Economy in 11 Republics of the FSU, 1989 
 
 
 
 
Official 
GNP  
(mln. rub.) 
Unofficial 
economy 
share, 1979 
Extrapolated 
shares of 
unofficial 
economy, 1989 
Unofficial 
GNP 
(mln. rub.) 
Total 
GNP 
(mln. rub.)
Azerbaijan 14,697  0.50  0.33  7,166  21,863 
Belarus 40,100  0.43  0.29  16,058  56,158 
Estonia 7,977  0.34  0.22  2,265  10,242 
Georgia 14,900  0.50  0.33  7,265  22,165 
Kazakhstan 46,363  0.50  0.33  22,606  68,969 
Latvia 12,488  0.34  0.22  3,546  16,034 
Lithuania 12,897  0.34  0.22  3,662  16,559 
Moldova  12,681  0.43  0.29  5,078  17,759 
Russia  626,300  0.27  0.18  137,786  764,086 
Ukraine  164,761  0.38  0.25  55,847  220,608 
Uzbekistan  32,430  0.50  0.33  15,813  48,243 
Total 985,594  0.34 0.22  277,094  1,262,688 
 
Sources: Official GNP is from World Bank (1993), Table 2b, pp. 10-11. We used 
the GNP data for 1990, because this was the earliest year for which such data were 
available to us. Given that we used these data only as relative weights, the 
difference between 1990 and 1989 must have been negligible. Unofficial economy 
shares for 1979 are calculated based on Grossman (1991). William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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Table 6. Estimates of Unofficial Economies in 1995 
 
 
 
 
Unofficial 
economy 
share, 1989 
(%) 
Index of 
official 
GDP, 1995  
(1989=100) 
Index of 
electricity 
output, 1995 
(1989=100) 
Unofficial 
economy 
share, 1995 
(%) 
Unofficial economy 
share, 1995 Johnson 
et al. (1997) 
(%) 
Azerbaijan 32.8  31.4  70.1  69.9  60.6 
Belarus 28.6  56.1  61.2  34.5  19.3 
Estonia 22.1  69.1  68.9  21.9  11.8 
Georgia 32.8  16.0  37.6  71.4  62.6 
Kazakhstan 32.8  46.5  62.3  49.8  34.3 
Latvia 22.1  47.3  62.3  40.9  35.3 
Lithuania 22.1  45.1  50.6  30.6  21.6 
Moldova  28.6  43.0  58.8  47.8  35.7 
Russia  18.0  49.1  74.0  45.6  41.6 
Ukraine  25.3  39.0  67.0  56.5  48.9 
Uzbekistan  32.8  84.0  79.0  28.5  6.5 
 
Sources: Columns 1 and 4 are based on authors' calculations. Columns 2, 3 and 5 are from 
Table 1 in Johnson et al. (1997). 
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Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics; numbers under "Gov" are coefficients on governance variables. 
 
*Significant at 5% level; **Significant at 1% level. 
 
Boldened results are those reported in Johnson et al. (1997). 
 
†For "regulation," no observations for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
 
Sources: The legal safeguards, crime and corruption and tax burden variables were taken from the December 
1995-January 1996 issue of the.  A panel of eight experts was asked to rank 26 transition countries on the basis 
of a number of factors affecting business.  Grades were given on a scale of 0 to 10, with 10 representing the 
best environment for business.  The panel members included: Dirk Damrau, Salomon Brothers Internation; 
Susanne Gahler, JP Morgan; Donald Green, PlanEcon; Andreas Gummich, Deutsche Bank Research; Peter 
Havlik, Vienna Institute for Comparative Economic Studies; Jonathan Hoffman, CS First Boston; James 
Lister-Cheese, Independent Strategy; and Werner Varga, Creditanstalt Bankverein.  In their article, Johnson et 
al. (1997) refer to the "tax fairness" and "corruption" variables from the survey in the Central European Economic 
Review; the survey actually asked about "tax burden" and "crime and corruption." 
The regulation variable was created by experts at the Heritage Foundation (see www.heritage.org/index).  The 
original scale was from 0 to 4, with 0 meaning that there is little or no corruption, existing regulations are 
straightforward, not burdensome and applied uniformly to all businesses.  We follow Johnson et al. (1997) by 
reversing the scale so that 4 means the least burdensome regulation, allowing us to consistently have the pro-
business governance scored with the higher numbers. 
As reported in Johnson et al. (1997), we use the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development's "legal 
effectiveness" index for 1995. 
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Table 8. Regressions of Unofficial Economy (as % of GDP) on Governance Indicators and Estimated Share 
of Unofficial Economy in 1989 
 
   17 Transition Countries  15 Transition Countries 
      (excluding Belarus and Uzbekistan) 
 
   Johnson et al. Authors Johnson  et al. Authors   
   Gov  Init  R2 Gov  Init  R2  Gov Init  R2  Gov Init  R2  
 Legal  OLS  -.045 .728 .355  -.037 .920 .640  -.063 .665 .690 -.048  1.090  .842   
Safeguards   (-2.73)*  (1.04)     (-2.02)#(1.77) #     (-5.15)**(1.36)    (-3.58)**(2.93)*  
   IV  -.041  .697  .353  -.031  1.051  .637 -.064  .672  .690 -.046  1.126  .841 
     (-2.06) #  (0.98)   (-1.04)  (1.52)   (-2.06)* (0.98)    (-2.26)*(2.41)*    
 
Crime and  OLS  -.043  .744 .373  -.035 .976 .656  -.058 .676 .692 -.043  1.188  .856   
Corruption   (-2.84)*  (1.07)     (-2.22)*(2.06) #     (-5.17)**(1.38)   (-3.90)**(3.56)**   
   IV  -.041  .731  .372  -.031  1.054  .655 -.064  .721  .685 -.045  1.151  .855 
     (-2.14)*  (1.04)    (-1.17)  (1.66)   (-4.31)**(1.44)  (-2.50)*  (2.71)* 
    
Tax Burden  OLS  -.057  .545 .251  -.042  1.151  .592  -.118 .442 .786 -.097  .989  .897   
     (-2.12) # (0.73)     (-1.39)(2.15)*     (-6.61)**(1.01)   (-5.11)**(3.34)**   
    IV  -.076 .614 .226  -.085 .609 .529 -.124  .454  .784 -.109  .864  .893 
     (-2.05) #  (0.80)   (-1.24)  (0.64)   (-5.29)**(1.12)   (-3.05)** (2.01) #   
Regulation† OLS  -.144 -.553 .511 -.051  1.586  .667 -.143 -.585 .517 -.039  1.772  .692   
     (-3.51)**(-0.84)     (-1.11)(2.99)*     (-3.41)**(-0.87)     (-0.80)(3.13)**  
   IV  -.215  -.959  .388  -.088  1.318  .650 -.210  -.967  .404 -.066  1.562  .684 
     (-3.68)**(-1.26)   (-1.22)  (1.96) #   (-3.54)**(-1.24)   (-0.83)  (2.08)#  
    
Legal OLS  -.088  .481  .285 -.062  1.14  .595 -.131 .323 .589 -.087  1.297  .785   
Effectiveness   (-2.32)*  (0.66)     (-1.43)(2.13) #     (-4.13)**(0.58)     (-2.50)* (3.06)**   
    IV  -.100 .501 .280  -.086 .925 .585 -.152  .341  .574 -.114  1.086  .774 
     (-2.03) # (0.68)    (-1.02)  (1.12)    (-3.69)**(0.60)   (-1.83) #(1.84) #    
 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics; numbers under "Gov" are coefficients on governance variables; "Init" is the 
share of the unofficial economy in 1989 as estimated by Johnson et al. and the authors, respectively. 
# Significant at 10% level;  * Significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% level. 
Boldened results are those reported in Johnson et al. (1997). 
†For "regulation," no observations for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
Sources: See note in Table 7. All governance data are for 1995. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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Appendix 
 
Table 1A. Regressions of Unofficial Economy (as % of GDP) on Governance Indicators and  
Soviet Dummy 
 
   17 Transition Countries  15 Transition Countries 
      (excluding Belarus and Uzbekistan) 
   Johnson et al. Authors  Johnson et al. Authors   
   Gov  Sov  R2 Gov  Sov  R2  Gov Sov  R2  Gov Sov  R2  
 Legal  OLS  -.036 .033 .310  -.044 .115 .605  -.055 .033 .648 -.055  .115  .775   
Safeguards   (-1.61)  (0.31)     (-2.38)* (1.27)   (-3.26)**(0.42)     (-3.67)**(1.57)    
 
Crime and  OLS  -.035  .031 .325  -.040 .120 .604  -.051 .038 .650 -.051  .126  .760   
Corruption   (-1.72)  (0.29)     (-2.36)* (1.35)     (-3.28)**(0.49)   (-3.45)**(1.69)     
 
Tax Burden  OLS  -.039  .074 .247  -.053 .154 .544  -.114 .010 .765 -.114  .101  .837   
     (-1.09)  (0.67)     (-1.74) (1.63)     (-4.67)**(0.16)   (-4.83)**(1.63)     
 
Regulation†  OLS -.118  .146  .648 -.116  .236  .760 -.113 .165 .691 -.113  .248  .774   
     (-3.56)**(2.38)*     (-3.76)**(4.14)**   (-3.53)**(2.72)*   (-3.61)**(4.15)**    
 
Legal OLS  -.068  .061  .280 -.079  .154  .556 -.110 .067 .601 -.109  .159  .715   
Effectiveness   (-1.37)  (0.58)     (-1.86) (1.70)     (-2.83)*(0.85)   (-2.85)*  (2.04)    
 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics; numbers under "Gov" are coefficients on governance variables; "Sov" is a 
dummy variable for former Soviet republics. 
 
* Significant at 5% level; ** Significant at 1% level. 
 
Boldened results are those reported in Johnson et al. (1997). 
 
†For "regulation," no observations for Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. 
 
Sources: see note in Table 7. All governance data are for 1995.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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Table 2A. Regressions of Unofficial Economy (as % of GDP) on Governance Indicators   
      
   Lacko Authors     
   Gov  R2   Gov  R2    
 Legal    -.015 .428    -.060 .552       
Safeguards   (-3.24)**       (-4.16)**        
Crime  and    -.013 .407    -.055 .543       
Corruption   (-3.10)**       (-4.08)**              
Tax  Burden    -.023 .415    -.086 .470     
     (-3.15)**      (-3.52)**       
Regulation†    -.032 .282    -.141 .446     
     (-2.17)*       (-3.11)**         
Legal    -.031 .354    -.124 .470 
Effectiveness   (-2.85)*      (-3.52)**  
 
Note: Lacko produced estimates for the ratio of the hidden economy to the official GDP.  Since we and Johnson et al. 
(1997) used the ratio of the hidden economy to total GDP as our dependent variable, we adjust Lacko's estimates 
according to the following formula: L/(1+L), where L refers to Lacko's estimate of the ratio of the hidden economy to 
official GDP.  We thus convert her estimates into the ratio of the hidden economy to total GDP.  She produces 
estimates for twenty countries.  The above regressions are, however, just run for the sixteen countries for which we 
both have estimates.  These are the seventeen countries listed in Table 2 minus Moldova.  
   William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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Table 3A. Regressions of Unofficial Economy (as % of GDP) on World Bank Governance Indicators 
 
  17 Transition Economies  15 Transition Economies 
 
  Johnson et al. Authors Johnson  et al. Authors 
Governance  
 Indicator Gov  R2 Gov  R2  Gov R2 Gov  R2 
Voice and  -.084  .136  -.151  .370 -.200  .588 -.251  .680 
Accountability (-1.54)    (-2.97)**   (-4.31)**   (-5.26)** 
Political -.167  .309  -.226  .477 -.225  .578 -.265  .588 
Instability (-2.59)*    (-3.70)**   (-4.22)**   (-4.31)** 
Government -.115  .153  -.180 .318  -.209 .460  -.249 .481 
Effectiveness (-1.64)    (-2.64)*   (-3.33)**   (-3.47)** 
Regulatory -.077  .105  -.143  .307 -.228  .604 -.278  .664 
Burden (-1.32)   (-2.58)*   (-4.45)**   (-5.07)** 
Rule    -.139 .176  -.217 .362 -.270  .561 -.319  .579   
of Law  (-1.79)    (-2.92)*   (-4.07)**   (-4.23)** 
Graft  -.175 .309  -.239 .488 -.244  .611 -.286  .618   
   (-2.59)*    (3.78)**   (-4.51)**   (-4.59)**   
 
Numbers in parentheses are t-statistics; numbers under "Gov" are coefficients on governance variables. 
*Significant at 5% level; **Significant at 1% level. 
 
Note: May et al. (forthcoming) first noted the relatively poor fit between these governance variables 
and the unofficial economy estimates of Johnson et al. (1997). 
 
Source: World Bank. William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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ENDNOTES 
1 Our use of Berkeley-Duke data is justified in part because it was the only family budget survey specifically 
aimed at studying the unofficial or second economy in the USSR and because Kaufmann and Kaliberda claim 
to have derived their estimates, in part, from Berkeley-Duke data. 
2 Dobozi and Pohl (1995) first addressed the degree of correlation between measured output and electricity 
consumption during the transition.  
3 Kaufmann and Kaliberda note several biases in using electricity consumption as a proxy for overall GDP.  
Applying a near-unit-elasticity assumption could lead to incorrectly high estimates of total output if the 
economy slumps and electricity is primarily a fixed cost, or if electricity costs rise because of a lack of basic 
maintenance,  or if energy users substitute from other sources to electricity.  Downward biases could result 
from improved efficiency in electricity use, price-induced substitution away from electricity, or a shift in 
output away from electricity-intensive industries.  On balance, they feel that the upward and downward biases 
offset each other. 
4 This figure is calculated with the assumption of unitary output elasticity of electricity consumption and 
according to the formula (105-92.7)/105=11.7%. 
5 See footnote 25 in Kaufmann and Kaliberda (1996). 
6 Kaufmann and Kaliberda produce estimates for 1994 and present them in a bar graph that indicates the 
relative sizes of unofficial economies across republics.  Exact percentages are not provided.  Johnson et al. 
(1997) use the same methodology and baseline estimates to update the estimates for 1995.  They provide the 
exact percentages for both 1994 and 1995. 
7 Rutgaizer (1992) presents a survey of estimates made by Soviet researchers who, as he stresses, provided 
virtually no substantiation for their numbers. The estimates from other surveys of emigrants out of the USSR 
are reported in Ofer and Vinokur (1992) and Millar (1987). Note, however, that unlike the Berkely-Duke 
project, neither of these surveys focused on the study of the underground economy. 
8 See Smith (1997) for arguments along these lines. 
9 See footnote 23 in Kaufmann and Kaliberda. Braithwaite’s estimate of approximately 13% of the labor force 
being engaged in the unofficial economy relates to the post-1992 period. More important, her estimate is 
derived under the apparent assumption that none of the full-time officially employed individuals participated 
in the unofficial economy. We think that this assumption is at great odds with casual observation and 
undermines the validity of Braithwaite’s estimates. 
10 Note, however, that a significant share of unofficial income was obtained by using state-owned capital at 
state-owned enterprises.  
11 The estimates of the dynamics of unofficial economy made by the Soviet researchers are summarized in 
Rutgaizer (1992). Alexeev and Treml (1994) provide some econometric evidence of its growth. See also 
Alexeev (1997) for a discussion of the reasons for the growth of the underground economy in the USSR in 
the late 1980’s. 
12 The CIA estimates of Soviet GNP growth for 1980 are reported in Levine (1983). Noren and Kurtzweg 
(1993) present CIA GNP growth estimates for 1981-1989 and electricity output growth rates for the same 
period. The growth rate of electricity output for 1980 was calculated based on Narodnoe (1981). 
13 This number is obtained as (1.36− 0.88⋅ 1.21)/1.36≈ 0.22. We use unitary elasticity of output with respect to 
electricity consumption for the 1979-89 period essentially by default, as we do not have strong priors for the 
value of this elasticity in the former USSR.  William Davidson Institute Working Paper 436 
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14 To derive this formula, normalize the total 1989 GDP to 1. Then the official 1995 GDP can be obtained as 
XOF⋅ (1-UE89), implying that the unofficial economy in 1995 is XEL −  XOF⋅ (1-UE89). The formula for the share 
of this unofficial economy is then obtained by dividing the latter expression by XEL. 
15 Tables 2 and 3 in Johnson et al. (1997) also present regressions with several other governance variables 
which we have chosen not to present here.  The data for “internal liberalization” were not available publicly.  
“External liberalization” and “large-scale privatization” do not relate as directly to governance and firm-level 
decisions to enter the underground economy as variables measuring the legal, regulatory and tax 
environments. “Rule of law” was constructed in 1997, two years subsequent to the unofficial economy data; 
the origins of the “legal extensiveness” data were not clear.  
16 In later studies using cross-section data that included OECD and developing countries, Johnson et al. 
(1998) and Friedman et al. (2000) continued to use the same set of unofficial economy size estimates for 
transition countries.  These had been constructed with output and electricity consumption data through 1995.  
These later studies, however, regressed these estimates on a number of governance indicators that had been 
created after 1995. 
17 In Johnson et al. (1998) and Friedman et al. (2000), the argument about the uniqueness of these countries is 
not made and Belarus and Uzbekistan are included in the regressions. 
18 Using growth rate of the shares during 1989-95 period would have presented its own problems, because 
higher initial shares would tend to grow slowly simply because they would have less room for growth. In the 
limit, if a country’s share of unofficial economy is 100%, it could only decline.  
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